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ATTENTION SEEKING: TECHNICS, PUBLICS 
AND FREE SOFTWARE INDIVIDUATION 
Ben Roberts 
 
 
 
In his widely-cited article, ‘The Attention Economy and the Net’, 
Michael H. Goldhaber argued for a transformation in the nature of 
economic life in the network age. The industrial model, having 
displaced the feudal economy, was now itself being replaced by an 
economy where attention was the scarce resource and not material 
wealth or labour. Since the allocation of resources is the very 
business of economics, this change was to result in a transformation 
of the laws governing economic life. As Goldhaber put it, ‘economics 
is about the overall patterns of effort and motivation that shape our 
lives, and it is these patterns and motivations that are changing. That 
implies a wholly new set of economic laws that replace the ones we 
all have learned’ (Goldhaber, 1997). Essentially, human attention, 
being inherently in short supply, was to become the source of 
economic value. Goldhaber was not alone in his thesis about this 
economic shift. Davenport and Beck argued that ‘in the factories of 
the Industrial Revolution, physical manpower drove the economy .... 
now, as flows of unnecessary information clog worker brains and 
communication links, attention is the rare resource that truly powers 
a company’ (2002: 17) Although Goldhaber didn’t tie the arrival of 
the attention economy exclusively to the appearance of digital 
networks it was clear that the Net provided the paradigmatic 
example of the change he describes. In a later essay, ‘The Value of 
Openness in an Attention Economy’, Goldhaber puts it like this: 
 
[the] Attention Economy is the natural economy 
of the Internet. But not just the Internet, in fact, 
increasingly of all of society. In my view, this 
economy, while in certain ways very old, is now 
moving to be the dominant economy in which 
humans live. It is fast replacing, not merely 
transforming, the economy based on money, on 
the market, and on the industrialized exchange, 
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distribution and production of standardized 
material goods. The rise of the net itself is merely 
one indication of this trend. (Goldhaber, 2006) 
 
In this later essay Goldhaber also argues that openness is a key 
component in the attention economy. Openness and sharing online 
is motivated not by altruism but by the need to ‘increase one’s 
supply, not of money or material goods, but of a very different, but 
intrinsically scarce entity, namely the attention of other human 
beings’ (Goldhaber, 2006). The relationship between openness and 
attention is illustrated in part by reference to the world of free, libre 
and open source software (FLOSS). For Goldhaber the value of a 
programmer sharing in the context of software production is to 
garner new forms of attention and recognition by ‘having others 
align their minds with that of the coder’ (2006). The users and 
creators of free software can thus be seen as a form of ‘fan-base’ or 
‘entourage’.  In this essay I will contest the idea that FLOSS practice 
can be explained mainly or primarily as an attention economy. But 
first, I wish to explore briefly what I see as problematic aspects of 
Goldhaber’s understanding of the attention economy. 
 
The primary assumption of Goldhaber’s account is that attention 
replaces material things and money as the measure of value. It is easy 
to find examples in the online world of attention as a measure of 
value. From the early days of the Internet page hits and visitor 
numbers have been used to encapsulate the value of a particular 
website. Social media makes the visible enumeration of friends or 
followers the measure of an individual’s importance and social 
worth. Numerous companies provide tools that enable companies to 
evaluate the level of ‘attention’ their brand is garnering in social 
media. There are even companies such as klout.com who seek to 
measure the extent of a particular individual’s influence (or clout) 
online. However, Goldhaber’s arguments go beyond simply saying 
that attention is a measure of value: on the contrary, it is the measure 
of value, replacing material and other sources of wealth. Moreover, 
and crucially, attention is not simply a measure but the source of 
value, being for him ‘desirable and valuable’ in itself and a 
‘prerequisite for survival’ in childhood (1997). Yet it’s not clear what 
the innate value of attention really is. At different points for 
Goldhaber the craving for attention is an instinct learned in infancy, 
the result of an innate tendency to imitation encapsulated in mirror 
neurons, or due to a desire to influence people and achieve 
immortality. But the argument that attention’s intrinsic value allows 
it to take the place of material commodities in a new form of 
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economic organisation seems to fall prey to the most basic of Marx’s 
arguments about the commodity, which is that material things are 
not valuable in and of themselves but are only the form of 
appearance of value in commodity exchange. As Marx argues, the 
inherent properties of the ‘ordinary sensuous thing’, a coat for 
example, only come to embody value when it is exchanged for 
another commodity and becomes the form of appearance of that 
other commodity’s value (1976: 147, 163). Similarly one might well 
argue of Goldhaber’s examples that at best attention is the form of 
appearance of value online.  
 
If attention is to play the role that material things or money play in 
commodity exchange it is surely because it is capable of representing 
value in an abstract fashion. Arguably just as one can’t understand 
gold money by analysing the chemical properties of gold, one can’t 
understand an attention economy simply through studying the 
cognitive or biological aspects of attention. Marx famously claims 
that the value of commodities is a function not of their material 
usefulness but the ‘socially necessary labour time’ involved in their 
production, in other words their value depends on how production 
is organised in a given society at a given point in history (1976: 129). 
Perhaps this insight is equally applicable to the attention economy 
described by Goldhaber – what is important is not the nature of 
attention in itself but what ‘paying attention’ tells us about the 
organisation of production online. Certainly it is difficult to see how 
the enormously qualitatively varied experience of ‘attention’ can be 
made to function quantitively as a ‘universal equivalent’, like gold 
and its aliquot parts. As Bernard Stiegler has asserted, commenting 
on a similar argument in Nacer Gasmi and Gilles Grolleau (2002): 
  
Businesses must now be attention-capture 
mechanisms for all their products and means of 
distribution, ‘because only a limited amount of 
attention is available’ – as if attention were a fluid 
whose volume and pressure could somehow be 
measured; as if it were not the result of education 
as the formation of the individual as such, through 
the interiorizing of psychotechniques crossing an 
organological set of connections resulting in 
construction and expansion of consciousness (i.e. 
discernment) and the critical capacity to analyze; 
that is, intelligence. (Stiegler, 2010b: 95) 
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A further problem with the concept of attention economy is the 
highly simplistic historicisation of economic life which Goldhaber’s 
analysis calls for. The simple division into ‘feudal’, ‘industrial’ and 
‘attention’ economies compresses the whole course of economic 
development since the industrial revolution into a single, 
presumably homogeneous phase, ignoring the transformations of 
capitalism over the last two hundred years. It says nothing about the 
difference between industrial production in the eighteenth century 
and modern consumer capitalism. It is particularly egregious, given 
the topic of attention, that Goldhaber has nothing to say about the 
tendency of consumer capitalist economies to organise attention 
through the agency of advertising and public relations. Taking these 
two problems together, it seems hard to see how attention can play 
the simple economic role that he envisages. 
 
Despite these reservations, there is clearly something interesting and 
important about the development of the discourse around attention 
economy. The concept is one of a series of ways in which writers 
have tried to think about apparently profound shifts in the nature of 
labour and production online: other examples include gift 
economies (Barbrook, 1998; Bergquist & Ljungberg, 2001); 
wikinomics (Tapscott & Williams, 2006); and theories of peer or 
nonmarket production (Benkler, 2002, 2006). These writers try to 
make sense of the vast and diverse nature of net production, a 
production which is often not the result of either market relations 
(as traditionally understood) or the organisational form of the 
company. The ‘poster child’ for these emerging forms of production 
very often is the world of free, libre and open source software. The 
production of free and open source software very often seems to act 
as a form of synecdoche for net production in general. For example, 
the term ‘open source’ is sometimes employed to refer to a whole 
range of online practice that don’t in fact involve ‘source code’ in the 
original sense. There are several reasons that this should be so. One 
is  the strong association between free software and the development 
of the Internet: much of the early software used to build it, such as 
the Apache web server, the Sendmail mail software and BIND DNS 
software was free or open-source software. As Chistopher Kelty puts 
it, ‘... the Internet looks the way it does because of Free Software’ 
(Kelty, 2008: 17). Another is that the software sphere is one in 
which new forms of production have competed directly and 
successfully with the old. Free software, such as the Linux operating 
system, competes directly with products, such as Microsoft 
Windows, sold on the market and produced in a traditional manner 
by paid employees within a single company. Yet in many instances 
 ROBERTS • ATTENTION SEEKING                                                       CM 13 • 2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net • 5  
free and open source software has prevailed. It is not surprising 
therefore that observers of these developments have sought to 
divine what economic principles lie behind this success and apply 
them more widely.  
 
For Goldhaber and others, the key is that the open nature of free 
software is better equipped to channel attention (both in the form of 
users and peer recognition from other programmers) (Goldhaber, 
2006: 14-5; Lerner & Tirole, 2002: 213-4). Richard Barbrook has 
asserted that the phenomena needs to be understood in terms of the 
operation of a new ‘hi-tech gift economy’ (Barbrook, 1998). Yochai 
Benkler and others have argued that digital networks have led to a 
radical lowering of what the economist Ronald Coase called 
‘transaction costs’, enabling a form of production managed by a 
group of decentralised individuals to compete with the traditional 
organisational form of the corporation (Benkler, 2002; Coase, 1937; 
Tapscott & Williams, 2006). However, the tendency to seek 
economic explanations of free software has significant problems. It 
assimilates large and potentially complex social and cultural changes 
to relatively simple changes in the nature of economic motivation 
and organisation. It often also ties these changes very narrowly to 
the emergence and evolution of digital networks. As David Berry has 
argued in relation to Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks this can be 
seen as a form of ‘weak technological determinism’ (2008: 369). 
Building on Tiziana Terranova’s acute analysis of the neglect of 
labour in discussions of network culture, I have criticised elsewhere 
Benkler’s explanation of the economics of peer production in terms 
of the arrival of cheap computers and distributed networks 
(Terranova, 2000; Roberts, 2011). In particular I argue that Benkler 
relies on the emergence of a special form of ‘creative labour’ and a 
highly autonomous form of working practice which is able to 
organise itself in a distributed manner. While the network obviously 
facilitates this type of working it can’t entirely explain the emergence 
of this new type of labour. Indeed as  Luc Boltanski and Eve  
Chiapello show in The New Spirit of Capitalism these new forms of 
autonomous working can be seen as part of large scale shifts in the 
nature and ‘spirit’ of capitalism over the last three decades and 
should not simply be traced to the arrival of digital networks. 
Moreover, as they argue, it is crucial to understand the social and 
cultural aspects of these transformations in order to ‘break with a 
fatalistic vision of technological determinism’ (2007: xix).   
 
It is in this context that Christopher Kelty’s Two Bits: The Cultural 
Significance of Free Software (2008) makes a particularly important 
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intervention. Kelty’s book is an ethnographic study of people 
involved in making, distributing and using free software. However, it 
is also distinctively different from the narratives just mentioned, in 
that he is concerned with ‘a cultural reorientation, not only an 
economic or legal one’ (2008: 7).  Kelty interprets free software in 
the context of wider forms of free speech and debate, as an integral 
part of the creation of what he calls a ‘recursive public’, a kind of 
public that ‘includes the activities of making, maintaining, and 
modifying software and networks, as well as the more conventional 
discourse that is thereby enabled’ (2008: 29). The concept of 
recursion therefore refers to a public that is built through many 
different technical, legal and discursive levels: 
 
Coding, hacking, patching, sharing, compiling, 
and modifying of software are forms of political 
action that now routinely accompany familiar 
political forms of expression like free speech, 
assembly, petition, and a free press. Such activities 
are expressive in ways that conventional political 
theory and social science do not recognize: they 
can both express and ‘implement’ ideas about the 
social and moral order of society. Software and 
networks can express ideas in the conventional 
written sense as well as create (express) 
infrastructures that allow ideas to circulate in 
novel and unexpected ways. At an analytic level, 
the concept of a recursive public is a way of 
insisting on the importance to public debate of 
the unruly technical materiality of a political 
order, not just the embodied discourse (however 
material) about that order.  (Kelty, 2008: 8, my 
emphasis) 
 
There are a number of points that I want to make about Kelty’s 
concept of the ‘recursive public’. One is that the focus here is on a 
political and moral account of free software creation, not on the 
more utilitarian economic explanations favoured by Benkler and 
Goldhaber. Kelty emphasises the relationship between free software, 
free speech and the defence of the specific forms of freedom that the 
Internet has come to represent: ‘Geeks share an idea of moral and 
technical order when it comes to the Internet: not only this, but they 
share a commitment to maintaining that order because it is what 
allows them to associate as a recursive public in the first place’ 
(2008: 50). Another concept to note is that of recursion. Recursion 
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in the domain of computer programming refers to a situation where 
a procedure or function calls itself, often iteratively in order to 
complete a particular process. Kelty uses it in order to indicate that 
the kind of public he is concerned with is both constitutive of, and 
constituted by, the activity which goes on within it. As he puts it, 
‘geeks use technology as a kind of argument, for a specific kind of 
order: they argue about technology, but they also argue through it’ 
(2008: 29). Kelty’s point about recursion seems important because 
it marks an important distinction between free software and other 
forms of participatory culture online. One might think, for example, 
that there are obvious similarities (although, perhaps rather 
surprisingly, Two Bits doesn’t draw them) between the geek culture 
that Kelty describes and fan culture, a well established subject of 
ethnographic and other investigation in cultural studies (Hills, 2002; 
Jenkins, 2006; Sandvoss, 2005). Fan culture also involves a form of 
creative production or ‘unruly materiality’ in the form of fan fiction, 
websites and so on. Both groups make use of the Internet to bring 
together a geographically dispersed community around a particular 
interest. As Gabriella Coleman has recently charted, the online free 
software community has increasingly also manifested itself in forms 
of face-to-face sociality, such as the hacker conference, a type of 
meeting which might bear comparison to the fan convention 
(2010). However, crucially, the creativity to be found in fan culture 
doesn’t have the recursive form that Kelty identifies in free software. 
While fans may shape the infrastructure of their own culture (or 
public), for example, through the creation of websites, this is a very 
shallow form of recursion. Free software, as described by Kelty, is a 
form of public that manifests itself in layers of technical, legal and 
discursive infrastructure from low level protocols through the 
creation of software licenses to public discussion in mailing lists. It is 
a type of culture that is not only inextricable from its technical 
infrastructure, but comes into being through the creation of that 
infrastructure.  
 
Another point that seems important in Kelty’s account is the 
question of the public. As he admits, there is nothing new about 
applying the concept of the public sphere to the Internet. Kelty 
argues, however, that whereas much work in this area is concerned 
with ‘pronouncing whether or not the Internet fits Habermas’s 
definition of the bourgeois public sphere’, his concern is rather to 
refine the concept. Nonetheless, Kelty’s project has similarities with 
other attempts to apply the idea of the public sphere, such as 
Benkler’s argument for a ‘networked public sphere’ in The Wealth of 
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Networks. This is evident, if nothing else, from the rhetorical 
questions which Kelty poses at the end of his introduction: 
 
Are Habermas’s pessimistic critiques of the 
bankruptcy of the public sphere in the twentieth 
century equally applicable to the structures of the 
twenty-first century? Or is it possible that 
recursive publics represent a reemergence of 
strong, authentic publics in a world shot through 
with cynicism and suspicion about mass media, 
verifiable knowledge, and enlightenment 
rationality?  (Kelty, 2008: 23) 
 
Kelty declares Habermas’s understanding of the bourgeois public 
sphere conceptually inadequate to the domain of free software 
practice that he is describing. Yet it is clear from the quotation above 
that at the same time its strength and authenticity remain, in some 
sense, the yardstick by which the recursive public is to be judged. 
The concept of the public is thus crucial to his narrative, but it is a 
concept reviewed, in particular, through the lens of the ‘social 
imaginary’ drawn from the work of Charles Taylor (2004). What 
Kelty stresses in Taylor’s account is its sense of a social imaginary as 
a ‘metatopical’ space, that is a space not defined, like an assembly, 
theatre or coffee shop, by a geographic locale. Instead the 
metatopical public ‘knits together a plurality of such spaces into one 
larger space of nonassembly’ through ‘common understandings’ 
(Taylor, 2004: 86). As Kelty points out, when it comes to forms of 
discussion online, such as a mailing list, the distinction between 
topical and metatopical is not so clear cut: there’s a sense in which 
such a virtual space is itself a topos and also a sense in which it brings 
together discussions from other topical spaces, both geographical 
and non-geographical. However, for Kelty, individual mailing lists, 
the development of software and protocols and so on are themselves 
brought together in ‘the public’ or the social imaginary which is ‘the 
Internet’. Another point which he underlines in Taylor’s concept of 
the social imaginary is his refusal of the ‘dichotomy between ideas 
and material practice’ (Taylor, 2004: 86; Kelty, 2008: 39). In other 
words, the social imaginary is not to be understood as an ideal world 
separate from material practice and yet, at the same time, ‘the 
materialist thesis’ is not the ‘crucial explanatory factor’ (Taylor, 
2004: 32). Similarly, the recursive public of free software is to be 
understood as a social imaginary in the sense that the creation of 
software, networks and legal documents (licenses) also blur this 
distinction between the ideal and the material (2008: 39-40). At the 
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heart of free software culture is therefore the social imaginary of the 
Internet itself: 
 
... there is only one Internet. Its singularity is not 
technically determined or by any means 
necessary, but it is what makes the Internet so 
valuable to geeks. It is a contest, the goal of which 
is to maintain the Internet as an infrastructure for 
autonomous and autotelic publics to emerge as 
part of The Public, understood as part of an 
imaginary of moral and technical order: operating 
systems and social systems. (Kelty, 2008: 51) 
 
As is evident from his arguments here, while seeking to evolve the 
concept of the public from that of the Habermasian public sphere, 
Kelty nonetheless seems to share many of the political assumptions 
of Habermas and deliberative theory more generally. Put simply, 
while the concept of the public is refined and complicated, its 
normative status as an ideal of moral and social order is not. 
Therefore many of the criticisms which have been directed at the 
concept of the public sphere, as an understanding of the political or 
political culture, are equally applicable to Kelty’s account of the 
culture of free software as recursive public. As a social imaginary it 
relies on a consensual ideal of ‘the Internet’ as an imagined order, 
one shared between geeks and fiercely independent of government 
and other forms of control. This is summed up succinctly in David 
Clark’s statement, quoted by Kelty, ‘We reject kings, presidents, and 
voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code’ (Kelty, 
2008: 58). Habermasian ideas around the public sphere have long 
been criticised for the assumption that the goal of politics is the 
achievement of consensus through rational debate, free from 
existing power relations. Chantal Mouffe, in particular, has argued 
that ‘every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional 
hegemony, as a stabilisation of power and that always entails some 
form of exclusion’ (1999: 756). The move which asserts the 
independence of the public from other forms of power (e.g. the 
state) ignores the reality of the power relations at work. The rational 
consensus of publics, especially the public or the Internet, excludes 
difference as a foundational concept in political debate. As Mouffe 
puts it: ‘By postulating the availability of a public sphere where 
power and antagonism would have been eliminated and where a 
rational consensus would have been realised, this model of 
democratic politics denies the central role in politics of the 
conflictual dimension and its crucial role in the formation of 
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collective identities’ (1999: 752). At a very basic level, conceiving 
free software as a public means describing that world, with all its 
division and complexities, in terms of a wider moral and technical 
order rather than disorder.  
 
Another problem with the concept of the recursive public is that, as 
we have seen, recursion for Kelty means the public is constituted on 
many different levels, from the activities of programming software to 
online debate. However, Kelty’s understanding of these different 
levels or types of behaviour as a public might lead one to wonder if 
his ‘cultural reorientation’ is not privileging the discursive. In a sense 
this is summed up by the phrase I have already quoted, ‘geeks use 
technology as a kind of argument .... they argue about technology, 
but they also argue through it’ (2008: 29). The emphasis here is on 
software as argument; this is Kelty’s radical gambit in treating free 
software as culture. But there is a difference between arguing for the 
inseparability of the technical from the discursive and subordinating 
technical activity to a discursive model of argument, or of the public 
sphere. It must be recognised here that Kelty is trying to 
reconceptualise the public in order to include activities (such as 
coding) that would not usually be considered as discourse. 
Nonetheless, arguably his concept of the recursive public describes a 
hierarchy of levels (technical, legal, moral, political and so on) in 
which the individual and the technical are subordinate to the 
collective ‘social imaginary’. There is a risk that the question of the 
relationship with the technical is ultimately marginalised within 
Kelty’s account.  
 
What I would like to suggest is that what Kelty’s concept of recursive 
public, Goldhaber’s attention economy and Benkler’s concept of 
peer production as ‘decentralised individual action’ share, in 
admittedly very different ways, is an interest in questions of 
organisation and order. In the case of Goldhaber it’s the appearance 
of new forms of organisation and order (individuals and an attention 
economy) at the expense of the old (companies and industrial 
production). In the case of Kelty (and Benkler in The Wealth of 
Networks) it is the reappearance or rejuvenation of a form of order, 
the public, which is at least as old as the modern era. However, it 
might be useful to ask not what free software can tell us about new 
forms of order and organisation online but rather about the question 
of how such new structures come about. That is, we may want to 
think about these changes in terms of process rather than an 
achieved entity: a new economy or new type of public. It is here that 
the work of Gilbert Simondon provides a helpful perspective, one 
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which has inspired much recent thinking on the relationship 
between the technical and the social (Stiegler, 1998; Mackenzie, 
2002; Galloway & Thacker, 2007; Massumi et al., 2009).  
 
Simondon is useful here because of his focus on how things become 
the things that they are, the need, as he puts it, ‘to understand the 
individual from the perspective of the process of individuation 
rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual’ 
(1992: 300). Simondon’s emphasis on process here is crucial: the 
focus of his philosophy is individuation as becoming rather than 
individual as being, ontogenesis rather than ontology. The 
individual itself is not a stable entity but only a phase in a wider 
process of becoming, a ‘partial and relative resolution’, the product 
of a metastable equilibrium. Individuation here is not just that of the 
human individual (which Simondon calls the psychic individual) 
but also, for example, the crystal in the process of crystallisation, the 
biological individual, or the evolution of the collective social group. 
As I have argued elsewhere in relation to Benkler’s essay ‘Coase’s 
Penguin, or, Linux and “The Nature of the Firm”’, this 
understanding of the metastability of the individual can be usefully 
applied to the relationship between companies and FLOSS 
development. The company as individual, a seemingly indissoluble 
component of the capitalist economy, is revealed as only a 
metastable entity that becomes partly displaced by the emergence of 
new forms of organising production. Consisting of an interior milieu 
organised on a hierarchical command and control basis and an 
exterior milieu organised by the market, it can, in Simondonian 
terms, be thought of as ‘a partial and relative resolution manifested 
in a system that contains latent potentials’. The philosophical point 
here is that instead of trying to understand peer production by 
extending a presumably immutable set of economic laws (Benkler’s 
approach) we see it as the product of an ongoing ontogenesis, 
operating according to an emergent set of rules.  
 
Another important aspect of Simondon’s account is his argument 
that we need to understand the  psychic (human) individual and the 
collective as ‘individuating’ together. He calls this ‘systematic unity 
of internal individuation (psychic) and external individuation 
(collective)’ the transindividual (1992: 307). Essentially what I am 
contending here is that the transindividual may be a better way of 
thinking about what Kelty calls a recursive public. The concept of 
recursion already implies a process of public-making that takes place 
at many levels: technical, legal, political and so on. However, as I 
have suggested, the emphasis is always on the collective or social 
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dimension, the ‘public’. Moreover, the concept of public (or social 
imaginary) implies an ideal of social order, of the Internet as 
encapsulating a certain idea of freedom that informs the activities of 
geeks operating at different levels of recursion. Simondon’s concept 
of the transindividual, on the other hand, does not privilege the 
collective dimension but instead insists on the unity of individuation 
and places the emphasis on the process: public making rather than 
public, in Kelty’s terms.  
 
Ultimately Kelty’s radical insight into the way that discursive 
concepts are materialised in software and technical infrastructure 
somehow tends toward what Simondon would think of as a 
hylemorphic model of individuation: ‘software and networks ... 
express ideas’ (Kelty, 2008: 8), form shapes matter. It is precisely the 
limitations of the hylemorphic and substantive approaches to 
individuation that Simondon is trying to counter.  
 
This approach is also evident in his understanding of the 
relationship between the technical object and other forms of 
individuation, particularly as that argument is developed in Du mode 
d’existence des objets techniques (On the Mode of Existence of Technical 
Objects) (1958). There Simondon counters the opposition between 
culture and technics, whereby the technical object is seen as either a 
tool of no consequence or a threat to the human. As Michel Tibon-
Cornillot points out, the aim is therefore twofold (2002: 162). On 
the one hand Simondon seeks to understand technical objects in 
their specificity, as having their own form of evolution and not 
simply as products of scientific progress. On the other hand he also 
wants to show how technical objects are part of human reality.  
 
Just as is the case with the recursive public, forms of human 
organisation are bound up with forms of technical organisation, in 
that Simondon asserts the relationship between the technical object 
and the transindividual:  
 
The technical object taken according to its 
essence, that is, the technical object in as much as 
it has been invented, thought and willed, assumed 
by a human subject, becomes the support and the 
symbol of this relation which we would like to 
name transindividual ... Through the intermediary 
of the technical object an interhuman relationship 
is created which is the model of transindividuality 
(1958: 247–8, my translation).1  
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As Jean-Hugues Barthélémy has argued, there is a slight ambiguity 
here between the technical object as the ‘model’ of transindividuality 
and as the ‘support’ of the transindividual (2005: 142). Simondon’s 
approach in general does not go as far as some would like in 
asserting the ‘prosthetic’ relationship between the human and the 
technical. Indeed Bernard Stiegler has criticised Simondon for 
failing to understand fully the intrinsic relationship between psychic 
and collective individuation, on the one hand, and technical 
individuation on the other (Stiegler, 1993). Nonetheless 
Simondon’s approach to technical objects and the domain of 
technicity in general has compelling implications for our 
understanding of free software practice.  
 
Of course, writing in the 1950s, Simondon’s focus is not the world of 
software development, but more that of the factory, where he 
identifies labour itself and not surplus value as the source of the 
worker’s alienation. Because the worker is just an operator of the 
machine, their activity does not extend the process of technical 
invention, from which it is separated. In an important passage from 
the conclusion of Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 
Simondon points out that this alienation results in a separation of 
technical invention from the operation of machines:  
 
The machine is then known and used through 
labour and not through technical knowledge; the 
relation of the labourer to the machine is 
inadequate, because the labourer operates the 
machine without their action extending the 
activity of invention ... The alienation of the 
labourer translates itself into the rupture between 
technical knowledge and conditions of usage. 
This rupture is so pronounced that in a large 
number of modern factories the function of the 
tool setter (régleur) is strictly distinct from that of 
the user of the machine, that is, the worker, and it 
is forbidden for workers to set their own machine 
themselves. Moreover, the activity of tool setting 
is the one which extends most naturally the 
function of invention and construction: 
maintenance is a perpetuated invention, however 
limited (Simondon, 1958: 249–50, my 
translation).2  
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So there is a crucial separation here between knowledge about and 
use of the machine. But this rupture between the creation and use of 
technical objects does not stop at the gates of the factory. As 
consumers we are increasingly both prevented and forbidden from 
modifying or even fixing the tools we use. Nowhere is this more 
clear than in the case of software, where standard industry practice 
has been to sell software in a form that makes it very difficult if not 
impossible to modify (only the binary code, understandable by the 
computer and not the source code as written by the programmer, are 
provided). As Bob Young, the former CEO of FLOSS-oriented 
software company Red Hat, puts it, purchasing proprietary software 
is like buying a ‘car with the hood welded shut’ (Woo, 1999). This 
situation can be seen, as Stiegler argues, as a tendency in what he 
calls ‘hyperindustrial’ societies toward a generalised 
proletarianisation in which we are deprived of the ability to create or 
modify the industrial cultural objects which are the objects of our 
consciousnesses (2010a: 56). Even when modification is technically 
feasible, draconian extensions of copyright law to enforce software 
licenses can be used to block ‘tinkering’. Lawrence Lessig takes the 
example of the Sony Aibo pet dog: an owner who had put online 
instructions on how to hack the robotic dog to ‘dance jazz’ received 
a notice under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
to take down their site because modifying their ‘dog’ was deemed by 
Sony’s lawyers to be interfering with a ‘copyright protection device’ 
(2004: 92–5).  
 
The starting point of free software, on the other hand, is precisely a 
‘freedom to tinker’, that is, the potential, as Simondon puts it above, 
to extend the activity of invention. Free software creates, as we have 
seen, a kind of community around the modification of technical 
objects, in this case software. As Kelty has argued, this community is 
simultaneously discursive, intersubjective and technical. One might 
argue that in the free software community of hackers and users we 
see a transformation in the alienated relationship Simondon 
describes between worker and machine. It is interesting therefore to 
consider a late passage from Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 
where Simondon addresses what it would mean to have an 
‘adequate’ relationship with the technical object: 
  
The relation to the technical object cannot 
become adequate individual by individual, except 
in rare and isolated cases, it can only be instituted 
to the extent that it happens to bring into 
existence that collective interindividual reality, 
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which we call transindividual, through creating a 
coupling between the inventive and 
organisational capacities of several subjects. There 
is a relation of causality and of reciprocal 
conditioning between the existence of clear, non-
alienated technical objects, used according to a 
rule which does not alienate, and the constitution 
of such a transindividual relation. One could wish 
that industrial life and businesses included, at the 
level of company boards, technical boards; in 
order to be efficient and creative, a company 
board should be essentially technical. The 
organisation of information channels in a business 
must follow the technical lines of operation and 
not those of the social hierarchy or purely 
interindividual relations, inessential in relation to 
the technical operation.3 (Simondon, 1958: 253) 
 
What I want to suggest is that the form of organisation that 
Simondon imagines here, where the hierarchical form of the 
company board is replaced by a purely technical form of 
organisation, is in some ways a rather useful way of thinking about 
the role that the free software ‘project’ has come to occupy in 
relation to the software industry. That is, the ‘project’ comes to 
stand for a form of organisation along ‘technical lines of operation’ 
rather than commercial considerations. One might regard Linus 
Torvalds and the other leading Linux developers as a kind of 
technical board that organises the production of the Linux kernel. 
However, the difference here from Simondon is that this technical 
board itself exists outside the borders of the company, or outside the 
borders of a particular company. Many of the Linux developers 
continue to work inside commercial companies, such as Red Hat, 
Intel, IBM and Google but coordinate their work via the wider 
‘project’ (Corbet, 2011; Kelty, 2011: 473). The point here is not 
that management hierarchy has been usurped by ‘decentralised 
individual action’ as Benkler (2006) would have it, but rather that it 
has been replaced or supplemented by another form of organisation, 
a new form of hierarchy that is recognised in the role of Torvalds 
and his lieutenants. As Bruce Kogut and Anca Metiu put it, 
 
In practice, the development process is 
centralized, being distributed but subject to 
hierarchical control. New code is submitted to 
Torvalds, who decides whether or not to accept it, 
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or request modifications before adding it to the 
Linux kernel. In this sense, Torvalds is the 
undisputed leader of the project, but there is no 
official organization that institutionalizes this role. 
(2001: 253)  
 
As the Linux case suggests, the ‘project’ is a rather curious entity. It 
may be simply defined by the code itself and an associated network 
of contributors and users of that software. Alternatively it may be 
supported by a nonprofit organization (for example, the GNOME, 
Mozilla and Apache Software foundations). In the case of the 
Debian project, a community distribution of Linux, the project can 
go as far as producing its own democratic infrastructure, including 
its own version of the Condorcet voting method for electing its 
leaders (Debian Project, n.d.). But in any case projects go beyond 
simply the organization of production and include aspects of social 
and cultural identification as we have already seen in relation to 
Kelty’s recursive public.  
 
Simondon offers us a useful way of thinking about the free software 
project in terms of a new transindividuation, a disturbance in the 
metastable equilibrium between individuals and companies. This is 
an important alternative to simply seeing it as the effect of some new 
economic law, be it the ‘attention economy’ (Goldhaber) or ‘peer 
production’ (Benkler). This is not a case of technology simply 
providing a way to free decentralised individuals from the collective 
dimension of the corporation. Rather, it points to the metastability 
and malleability of the corporation and the potential for new forms 
of psychic and collective individuation to operate both inside and 
outside its boundaries. In this sense the free software project is both 
a more and less radical ‘symptom’ than the visionaries of a new 
attention economy might have imagined.  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 ‘L’objet technique pris selon son essence, c’est-à-dire l’objet 
technique en tant qu’il a été inventé, pensé et voulu, assumé par un 
sujet humain, devient le support et le symbole de cette relation que 
nous voudrions nommer transindividuelle.’ 
 
2 ‘La machine est alors connue et utilisée à travers le travail et non à 
travers le savoir technique; le rapport du travailleur à la machine est 
inadéquat, car le travailleur opère sur la machine sans que son geste 
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prolonge l’activité d’invention … L’aliénation du travailler se traduit 
par la rupture entre le savoir technique et l’exercice des conditions 
d’utilisation. Cette rupture est si accusée que dans un grande 
nombre d’usines modernes la fonction de régleur est strictement 
distincte de celle d’utilisateur de la machine, c’est-à-dire d’ouvrier, et 
qu’il est interdit aux ouvriers de régler eux-mêmes leur propre 
machine. Or l’activité de réglage est celle qui prolonge le plus 
naturellement la fonction d’invention et de construction: le réglage 
est une invention perpétuée, quoique limitée.’ 
 
3 ‘La relation à l’objet technique ne peut pas devenir adéquate 
individu par individu, sauf en des cas très rares et isolés ; elle ne peut 
s’instituer que dans la mesure où elle arrivera à faire exister cette 
réalité interindividuelle collective, que nous nommons 
transindividuelle, parce qu’elle crée un couplage entre les capacités 
inventives et organisatrices de plusieurs sujets. Il y a relation de 
causalité et de conditionnement réciproque entre l’existence 
d’objets techniques nets, non aliénés, utilisés selon un statut qui 
n’aliène pas, et la constitution d’une telle relation transindividuelle. 
On pourrait souhaiter que la vie industrielle et les entreprises 
comportent, au niveau des comités d’entreprise, des comités 
techniques ; pour être efficace et créateur, un comité d’entreprise 
devrait être essentiellement technique. L’organisation des canaux 
d’information dans une entreprise doit suivre les lignes de 
l’opération technique et non celles de la hiérarchie sociale ou des 
relations purement interindividuelles, inessentielles par rapport à 
l’opération technique.’ 
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